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SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RECONSIDERED: THE
POST-DUKE CITY DIFFICULTIES AND SOME
SUGGESTIONS FOR THEIR RESOLUTION
MICHAEL B. BROWDE*

INTRODUCTION
The substantial evidence standard provides the primary vehicle by which the
adjudicatory fact-finding of administrative agencies is subjected to judicial review. As a consequence, its application determines the result in most administrative appeals. In addition to providing the basis for decision in most cases,
however, the substantial evidence standard also serves as the stage upon which
a more generalized judicial struggle plays out whenever the court is applying
the standard. On that more abstract level the application of the substantial evidence standard invariably engages the court in the high-wire act of providing
some level of substantive review of the agency decision without encroaching on
the essential fact-finding role of the particular agency.
Of late, the substantial evidence concern of the New Mexico appellate courts
has focused on the proper articulation of the substantial evidence standard and
what it means. The current debate was triggered by the supreme court's 1984
decision in Duke City Lumber Co. v. New Mexico EnvironmentalImprovement
Board,' in which the court held "we now expressly modify the substantial
evidence rule as heretofore adopted by this Court and supplement it with the
whole record standard for judicial review of findings of fact made by administrative agencies." 2 Seeking to blunt the criticism that the new standard undermines agency authority over fact-finding and places the court in the position of
usurping that authority, the court characterized the new standard as but a "minor
*B.A., Brown University, 1965; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1968; Professor of Law,
University of New Mexico School of Law.
The author's renewed interest in this topic resulted from the request of his former colleague, The Honorable
Pamela B. Minzner, that he assist in a presentation concerning judicial control of agency action at the State
Bar's CLE program on "Administrative Practice and Procedure Before Natural Resources and Environmental
Regulatory Agencies," held in Santa Fe on May 21-22, 1987. This article is an expansion of the author's
brief comments made during that seminar.
The author wishes to acknowledge the debt of gratitude owed to Judge Minzner, for stimulating his
further thinking about this topic, and for helping to give some framework to those thoughts. He also wishes
to thank Dean Theodore Parnall for providing a summer research grant which enabled him to complete the
necessary research and finish the initial draft during the summer of 1987.
The author also acknowledges the aid of research assistants John Howard and John Shoeppner, who did
much of the difficult spade work.
1. 101 N.M. 291, 681 P.2d 717 (1984).
2. Id. at 294, 681 P.2d at 720. While Duke City involved fact-finding in the adjudicatory context, the
court of appeals recently held that the force of its logic applies equally to on-the-record rule-making, i.e.,
rule-making which is required by law to be based on a record formulated at a formal hearing. See, Tenneco
Oil Co. v. New Mexico Water Quality Control Comm'n., 107 N.M. 469, 760 P.2d 161 (Ct. App. 1987),
cert. denied, 107 N.M. 469, 760 P.2d 161 (1988). The application of Duke City to the rule-making context
is beyond the scope of this article.
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departure from the customary substantial evidence rule." 3 Unfortunately, the
Duke City court's attempt to clarify the meaning of the new standard has rather
confounded its meaning and left the law in a state of confusion. Furthermore,
the supreme court has not resolved the confused state of the law in its post-Duke
City substantial evidence cases.
Most recently, however, the court of appeals has entered the fray. While the
appeals court's recent opinions have brought some welcomed clarification, they
have also brought a disturbing new wrinkle which may cause more disruption
to the proper balance of authority between agency and court than the debate over
the articulation of the standard.
This article attempts to clarify what the new Duke City standard means, and
to suggest how it ought to be applied to meet the purposes for which it was
designed. It begins with a description of the current debate, 4 followed by a
review of the Duke City litigation. 5 It then reviews the post-Duke City substantial
evidence cases in search of further understanding of the Duke City standard. 6
The article then turns to the recent court of appeals decisions on the subject,
demonstrating how those opinions help clarify the Duke City standard, while at
the same time adding a new element which may significantly undermine the
purpose of the substantial evidence standard. 7 It then reviews the federal origins
of the whole record substantial evidence standard, for what that history may
offer to our understanding of the New Mexico debate. 8 The article concludes
with some suggestions for bringing the current debate to a close in a way which
may further the purposes of the substantial evidence standard, lead to more
principled resolution of substantial evidence cases, and reduce some of the
unnecessary burden these cases place on our appellate courts. 9
I. THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DEBATE
When a New Mexico appellate court reviews an administrative agency's factfinding, it does so under statutory or constitutional authority, which usually
articulates a standard of review. The traditional standard, whether or not explicit
in the law creating the agency, requires that a fact-based decision of the agency
be affirmed unless the decision is "not supported by substantial evidence."'"
3. Id. (quoting New Mexico Human Servs. Dep't v. Garcia, 94 N.M. 175, 177, 608 P.2d 151,
153 (1980)).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 10-21.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 22-57.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 58-88.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 89-134.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 135-52.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 153-80.
10. This "traditional" substantial evidence standard was initially formulated by the United States
Supreme Court in ICC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913) as a means of determining the
scope of review which should be given to findings of fact made by the Interstate Commerce Commission-4the first of the modem federal agencies with full adjudicatory powers. That standard then
became incorporated into later federal statutes which specifically provided for judicial review of
agency decisions. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (applying the
substantial evidence standard contained in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935).
The New Mexico appellate courts have, until recently, used that same standard to review agency
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That standard has been defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."" While easy to articulate,
the traditional substantial evidence standard of review has been subject to varying
applications, 2 as the courts have struggled to perform their review function
without undermining the fact-finding function of the agency involved.
The New Mexico courts have generally held that under the "traditional"
substantial evidence test the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the agency's action,' 3 the court must not weigh conflicting evidence or judge
the credibility of witnesses,' 4 and the reviewing court must ignore contrary
evidence against the agency's decision."' As thus formulated, the substantial
evidence standard gives great deference to agency fact-finding.
This general state of the New Mexico law of substantial evidence has been
complicated by a number of more modem judicial review statutes which specifically require that the substantial evidence test be applied by reference to "the
record as a whole."' 6 In these particular situations the legislature seems not to
have contemplated as much deference to agency fact-finding. 7 Until the Duke
City litigation, however, the New Mexico appellate courts did not seriously focus
on the distinction between the traditional substantial evidence standard and the
fact-finding, both when articulated in the statute creating the agency, see, e.g., Rinker v. State Corp.
Comm'n, 84 N.M. 626, 506 P.2d 783 (1973), and when the statute made no specific reference to
a reviewing standard. See, e.g., Toltec Int'l, Inc. v. City of Ruidoso, 95 N.M. 82, 619 P.2d 186
(1980).
I1. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Wilson v. Employment
Sec. Comm'n., 74 N.M. 3, 8, 431 P.2d 52, 55 (1963) (substantial evidence "means more than a
scintilla of evidence and contemplates such relevant legal evidence as a reasonable person might
accept as sufficient to support a conclusion"); see also, Wickerstam v. N.M. State Bd. of Educ.,
81 N.M. 188, 190, 464 P.2d 918, 920 (Ct. App. 1970).
12. As noted by Professor Davis, the substantial evidence standard "is made of rubber, not of
wood. It can be stretched . . . [a]nd the courts are both willing and able to do the stretching, in
accordance with what they deem to be the needs of justice." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT
530 (3d ed. 1972).
13. See, e.g., Rinker v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 84 N.M. 626, 627, 506 P.2d 783,
784 (1973).
This appears to be the same standard that reviewing courts in New Mexico apply to the review
of findings of fact made by a trial court, sitting without a jury. See Groff v. Stringer, 82 N.M. 180,
181, 477 P.2d 814, 815 (1970) ("we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to support
the finding, and any evidence unfavorable to the finding will not be considered."). The New Mexico
rule in this regard differs from the federal rule, which subjects trial court findings to review under
the "clearly erroneous" standard. See, e.g., Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 382 U.S. 607
(1966).
14. See, e.g., Lujan v. Pendaries Properties, Inc., 96 N.M. 771, 635 P.2d 580 (1981); Worthey
v. Sedillo Title Guar., Inc., 85 N.M. 339, 512 P.2d 667 (1973).
15. See, e.g., United Veterans Orgs. v. New Mexico Property Appraisal Dep't, 84 N.M. 114,
118, 500 P.2d 199, 203 (1973).
16. E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 27-3-4(F) (1978) (Public Assistance Appeals Act); see also,N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 61-1-20 (1978) (Uniform Licensing Act); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-8-22 (1978) (New
Mexico Administrative Procedures Act (APA), but not made applicable to any existing agencies).
17. Indeed, the general view has always been that the "whole record" substantial evidence standard
is a less deferential standard than the "traditional" substantial evidence standard. See Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477-91 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., reviewing the federal
legislative history and Congressional intent behind the whole record standard). For a further discussion
of Universal Camera, see infra text accompanying notes 135-52.
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more modem substantial evidence on the record as a whole standard. Indeed,
on some occasions the courts have confused if not melded the two standards.
For example, in one key case the court gave full consideration to the whole
record while undertaking review under the traditional substantial evidence standard, 8 and in another case the court seemed to ignore the whole record provision
of a statute, and afforded the agency the extreme deference of the traditional
standard by considering only the evidence supporting the agency decision."
In any event, during the last decade adherence to the traditional standard has
invited the criticism that by wholly ignoring the portion of the evidence which
was contrary to the ultimate decision reached, the courts were not performing
their proper function. Instead, the critics maintained, such deference to the agency
was tantamount to judicial abdication of the courts' statutory review function.
The cries, therefore, began to mount, that the substantial evidence test should
always require a review of the whole record, and that the court should articulate
a whole record standard to redress the balance in favor of a more meaningful
judicial review of agency fact-finding. 2
It is against that backdrop that the supreme court was drawn into the substantial
evidence debate in Duke City. The court rose to the challenge laid down by the
court of appeals in that case, 2' and jettisoned the traditional substantial evidence
standard, replacing it with the "whole record" form of that standard. The court
did so, however, in a manner which has engendered even more debate about
what the new standard means.
II. THE DUKE CITY LITIGATION
Duke City involved the protracted efforts of the State Environmental Improvement Board (EIB) to control the air pollution emanating from the wigwam
18. See, e.g., Ribera v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 92 N.M. 694, 594 P.2d 742 (1979). See
also, Utton, The Use of the Substantial Evidence Rule to Review Administrative Findings of Fact in
New Mexico, 10 N.M.L. REV. 103, 118-19 (Winter, 1979-80), and cases discussed therein.
19. See, e.g., New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs. v. Garcia, 94 N.M. 175, 608 P.2d 151 (1980).
If in fact Garciadoes represent a misapplication of the whole record standard, as has been suggested
elsewhere, see, 1979-80 Survey of Administrative Law, I I N.M.L. REV. I, 26-28 (Winter, 198081), then reliance on it in Duke City was bound to cause problems.
20. See Utton, supra note 18, at 103 (arguing for the adoption of the whole record standard).
Soon after Professor Utton's article, Justice Felter, in Jones v. Employment Servs. Div., 95 N.M.
97, 619 P.2d 542 (1980), wrote a compelling dissent from the court's affirmance of a district court
ruling that the Employment Services Division had properly denied unemployment compensation
benefits to the claimant. The court applied the traditional substantial evidence standard to affirm the
decision of the Agency and the district court. Justice Felter reviewed Justice Frankfurter's seminal
opinion in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), which outlined the basis and
purpose of the whole record substantial evidence standard. Based on that review, Justice Felter
concluded that the whole record standard is "a more providential approach to judicial review of
administrative action which should be adopted by this court." 95 N.M. at 101, 619 P.2d at 546
(Felter, J., dissenting). Under that more rigorous standard he would have reversed the Agency based
on the "great body of evidence opposed to the decision below." Id. at 102, 619 P.2d at 547.
21. In Duke City Lumber Co. v. New Mexico Envtl. Improvement Div., 101 N.M. 301, 661
P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 101 N.M. 291, 681 P.2d 717 (1984), the court of appeals made
a persuasive case for rejecting the traditional standard in favor of the whole record standard. The
court of appeals, however, found itself compelled by the doctrine of Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M.
717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973), to leave such a change in the law to the supreme court. 101 N.M. at
291, 681 P.2d at 717. See infra text accompanying notes 25-31.
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incinerator used at Duke City Lumber Company's Espanola sawmill to burn
some of its wood waste. Although Duke City and the Agency reached some
pollution control agreements during the 1970's, the case began in earnest in
1979 when Duke City applied for a variance from air quality control regulations.
The applicable statute allowed a variance when the regulatory limitation would
impose "undue economic burden . . . and . . . the granting of the variance

would not result in a condition injurious to health and safety." 22 After extensive
hearings the Board concluded that the record did not support the variance petition.
On appeal by Duke City, the court of appeals found sufficient evidence of
undue economic hardship, but was dissatisfied with the evidence on injury to
health and safety. The court, therefore, remanded the case to the Agency "to
determine whether the wood smoke

. . .

is injurious to health and safety." 2" On

remand, the Board again denied the variance. Duke City Company based its
second appeal on three grounds: that it had made a prima facie case that the
wood smoke was not injurious to health; that the Board's decision was not
that the Board acted arbitrarily in consupported by substantial evidence; 2and
4
sidering unsworn citizen testimony.
The court of appeals began its analysis by mounting a most compelling attack
on the traditional substantial evidence standard, arguing that the traditional standard should give way to the more modem whole record variation. The court first
pointed out that the New Mexico standard is "not only outdated, but contrary
to the rule followed by other jurisdictions and the federal courts.", 25 It then went
on to note that the United States Supreme Court discussion of the whole record
standard in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 26 the seminal case on the subject,
involved the interpretation of traditional substantive evidence statutory language,
and that the broader "whole record" standard did exist in some New Mexico
statutes.
The court found it unclear "why the legislature requires different standards
of review for different administrative agencies."- 27 Recognizing that a uniform
approach to judicial review could be accomplished by legislative action, the court
picked up on Professor Utton's suggestion that such uniformity could also be
accomplished by judicial interpretation, 28 and then went on to list the advantages
of a uniform whole record standard: "facilitating judicial economy

...

pro-

22. N.M. STAT. ANN. §74-2-8(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1981). (emphasis added.)
23. Duke City Lumber Co. v. New Mexico Envtl. Improvement Bd., 95 N.M. 401, 407, 622
P.2d 709, 715 (Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied, 95 N.M. 426, 622 P.2d 1046 (1981). For a discussion
of this aspect of the case, which involved the interesting problem of the respective burdens involved
in proving the negative assertion that the granting of the variance would not endanger health, see
1980-81 Administrative Law Survey, 12 N.M.L. REV. 1, 40-42 (1982).
Since this was the first of four appellate decisions in this case, it is often referred to as Duke City
i. Although the four opinions are identified in this article, only the supreme court's decision announcing the adoption of the whole record substantial evidence standard is central to the discussion.
That case is therefore referred to throughout as Duke City, even though it is more properly identified
as Duke City I!!.
24. Duke City Lumber Co. v. New Mexico Envtl. Improvement Div., 101 N.M. 301, 303, 661
P.2d 727, 730 (Ct. App. 1983) (Duke City 11), rev'd, 101 N.M. 291, 681 P.2d 717 (1984).
25. 101 N.M. at 304, 681 P.2d at 730.
26. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
27. 101 N.M. at 304, 681 P.2d at 730.
28. Id., citing Utton, supra note 18, at 120.
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moting even-handed treatment by all state administrative agencies, and helping
to insure that agencies which perform fact-finding, charging, and prosecutorial
functions do not lose sight of their statutory duty.
29
Finding itself bound, however, by supreme court precedent articulating the
traditional standard, the court applied that standard rather than the whole record
standard.3" Under that test, the court reviewed the evidence before the Board
and held "that the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom warrant
a denial [of the variance], because subtle effects resulting from these concentrations [of air pollutants] may tend to cause exacerbations of respiratory conditions. "3
32
It is in this posture that the supreme court was confronted with Duke City.
Certiorari was granted to resolve three questions-whether the court should adopt
the "whole record" standard, whether there was competent evidence to support
the agency decision, and whether the court of appeals' "tends-to-cause-harm"
standard was the proper legal standard under the applicable statute. 3 As previously noted, the court expressly adopted the whole record standard. In addition,
the court resurrected the "legal residuum rule" to strike the court of appeal's
reliance on citizen testimony provided at the public hearings.34 Neither of these
rulings were determinative, however, since the court's ultimate holding was that
the court of appeals had improperly relied on the "tends-to-cause-harm" standard
in interpreting the burden of proof under the applicable statute.3
29. Id.
30. The court cited United Veterans Orgs. v. New Mexico Property Appraisal Dep't, 84 N.M.
114, 500 P.2d 197 (Ct. App. 1972)--which expressly looked at the evidence in the light most
favorable to the agency decision-as an authoritative traditional substantial evidence case.
31. 101 N.M. at 310, 681 P.2d at 736. The court found that the Board was being asked to make
a judgment in an area where there was no available data to prove or disprove actual injury to health,
but that given the purposes of the Environmental Improvement Act and the Air Quality Control
Act---4o protect against harm before it occurred-no such rigid standard of proving actual injury
was required. To hold otherwise, said the court, would "not only thwart the purposes of the act in
question, but would relegate the agencies charged with its enforcement to reacting to catastrophes
after the fact." Id. at 305, 681 P.2d at 731.
The court went on to find that the Company had met its prima facie burden of showing no injury
to health through its modeling study. Id. at 306, 681 P.2d at 737. It then found that the Division
had carried its burden of rebutting the presumption raised by the Company's evidence. The court
came to that conclusion based on the application of the traditional substantial evidence standard to
the citizen testimony received at the hearing, coupled with the violations of the federal National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) established by the Division's modeling results. Id. at 30910, 681 P.2d at 735-36.
32. Duke City Lumber Co. v. New Mexico Envtl. Improvement Bd., 101 N.M. 291, 681 P.2d
717 (1984).
33. Id. at 292, 681 P.2d at 718.
34. For a discussion of the legal residuum portion of Duke City, see infra text accompanying
notes 47-57.
35. The court rejected the court of appeals' legal conclusion that it was sufficient to uphold the
denial of the variance because the evidence showed a condition which "tends to cause harm." The
court rejected that conclusion because it found a definition of air pollution in the Air Quality Control
Act which referred to contaminants which "may with reasonable probability injure human health."
Id. at 294, 681 P.2d at 720, citing N.M. STAT. ANN. §74-2-2(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1983).
Thus, the court reversed the case on ultra vires grounds-i.e., because in applying the "tendsto-cause-harm" standard the court of appeals had failed to follow the requirements of the Air Quality
Control Act. 101 N.M. at 295, 681 P.2d at 721. Furthermore, the court noted that its resolution of
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A. Adoption of the "Whole Record" standard
The Supreme court issued its initial Duke City opinion in November, 1983.
The Board, however, petitioned for rehearing, supported by briefs from the
Environmental Improvement Division and a number of other agencies opposed
to judicial imposition of the whole record standard. Upon rehearing, the court
withdrew its first opinion and issued a new opinion. The new opinion did not
alter the result. It changed only one substantive paragraph, 36 but that one paragraph substantially altered the court's explanation of the whole record standard.37
In the unchanged portion of the opinion, the supreme court mirrored the court
of appeals' criticism of the traditional substantial evidence standard by noting
that the traditional standard "shroud[s] the judgment of the reviewing courts with
imposed ignorance of enlightening evidence . . .[and] causes uneven treatment
among those who seek review of the actions of various administrative boards
and agencies." 38 Second, and again unchanged in the final opinion, the court
made clear that its adoption of the whole record standard is particularly appropriate where the agency performs multiple functions. The supreme court thus
picked up on the notion put forward by the court of appeals, that in such agencies
the whole record standard will help assure that the agency decisionmaking function remains independent and faithful to the statutory mandate. 9
this point would be the same under either substantial evidence standard, id., thus demonstrating that
the whole record portion of its decision was obiter dicta.
The court expressly reserved judgment on whether the emissions exceeded the NAAQS, and
remanded for a determination of whether a violation of that standard alone or in conjunction with
the medical evidence justified denial of the variance under the proper standard of review. Id.
On remand, the court of appeals, in Duke City Lumber Co. v. New Mexico Envtl. Improvement
Bd., 102 N.M. 8, 11,690 P.2d 451, 454 (1984) (Duke City IV) reviewed the record yet again and
held that "violation of the NAAQS for particulate matter, as established by substantial evidence in
this case, not only justified but mandated the denial of Duke City's application for a variance." The
court also concluded that a violation of NAAQS established per se injury to health.
36. The new opinion also expressly provided for a remand to the court of appeals to apply its
newly articulated standards-a necessary result which was implicit in the initial decision. The explicit
remand instructions, however, were addressed more to the statutory standard governing injury to
health, see supra note 35, than to the substantial evidence standard or the legal residuum rule.
37. All references to the unchanged portions of the opinion are to the reported final opinion rather
than the initial opinion which only appears at 22 N.M. Bar. Bull. 1362 (Dec. 22, 1983).
38. 101 N.M. at 293, 681 P.2d at 719. This brief reference to the major criticism of the traditional
substantial evidence standard found in Professor Jaffe's seminal work on the subject, see Jaffe,
Judicial Review of Questions of Fact, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1027 (1956), ignores one essential
fact-that for the most part the review standards are contained in statutes which directly control
judicial review of agency decisions. While the court of appeals, in Duke City H, may have been
correct in assuming that the choice of statutory language between "substantial evidence" and "substantial evidence on the record as a whole" has not been purposeful, see 101 N.M. at 304, 681 P.2d
at 730, if the legislature should make clear in the future that it intends the less rigorous traditional
substantial evidence standard (or any other standard created by legislative direction) to apply, then
the court should be bound to give effect to that law. In the absence of such a "clear statement" by
the legislature, however, the court's ruling in Duke City is tantamount to a presumption that whenever
the legislature uses the words "substantial evidence" it intends the court to apply the "whole record"
review standard. Cf. NCCI v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 107 N.M. 278, 756 P.2d 558
(1988) (absent an express legislative mandate to the contrary, the court will not infer that the burden
shifted to the Board to prove that the industry filing for an insurance rate increase did not satisfy
the statutory requirements).
39. In those agencies which engage in adjudicatory decisionmaking akin to the guilt or innocence
determinations of courts, while also performing the investigative and prosecutorial functions-i.e.,

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

Finally, and most importantly, the supreme court, in its initial opinion, drew
the critical distinction between the whole record standard and the traditional
substantial evidence test in the following terms:
The court will still only review the evidence in the record; it will not weigh
it. [citations omitted] Substantial evidence to support a finding is still the
rule; but instead of looking only to the evidence in the record favorable to
the finding and refusing to consider evidence unfavorable to the finding,
and instead of mandating a review of the evidence only in the light most
favorable to support the findings, the court will review the whole record to

determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the finding made
by the agency. 4°
It is that critical paragraph-making clear that under the new "whole record"
standard, agency fact-finding would no longer be viewed in the light most favorable to the agency decision-that the court eliminated in its final decision on
rehearing.
Bending to the cries of the agency participants at rehearing 4' the court's final
opinion did not contain the paragraph recited above. In its place the court substituted a quote from New Mexico Human Services Department v. Garcia,4 2 to
the effect that the courts are still to view the evidence in the light most favorable
agencies responsible for license revocation and professional discipline-the whole record standard
should also serve as a check against agency bias or overzealousness. A decisionmaker who knows
that a court will perform its reviewing function based on the whole record is more likely to be
mindful of the whole record in reaching his or her decision. In prosecutorial agencies that mindfulness
is particularly important.
It is interesting to note, however, that separation of functions was probably not a problem in the
environmental agency involved in Duke City. According to the Agency's brief, the Environmental
Improvement Board, as the decisionmaking body, is kept wholly separate and distinct from the
Environmental Improvement Division, which performs the investigative and prosecutorial functions.
See Brief of the EIB on Rehearing at 7-9.
40. 22 N.M. Bar. Bull. at 1365 (second emphasis added.)
41. The Environmental Improvement Board argued for retention of the traditional standard whereby
the evidence is viewed "in the light most favorable to the agency decision," claiming that Duke
City had never objected to such a standard, and that "a cursory canvas" revealed that the doctrine
was alive and well throughout the country. Brief of EIB on Rehearing at 20-21.
The Board's most telling point was that the traditional standard is different from the whole record
standard, and that the existence of both standards in various statutes evidences a legislative intent
that different standards be applied to different agencies. The Board, therefore, argued that the failure
of the court to give meaning to the two different standards found in different statutes did violence
to separation of powers. Id. at 4-6.
The Board also rejected evenhandedness as a goal to be achieved by a single standard, arguing
that the traditional standard makes particular good sense as a reviewing standard for agencies having
technical expertise. Id. at 9-18.
The Environmental Improvement Division supported the Board's position, arguing that the substantial evidence standard should never allow the court to judge the credibility of the witnesses or
to reweigh the evidence. Brief of the Environmental Improvement Division at 12. The Public Service
Commission argued that injection of the whole record standard would result in an increased number
of appeals. Public Service Commission Brief in Support of Rehearing at 6-7. The City of Albuquerque
took a narrower tack, arguing that the traditional substantial evidence test was required by the Air
Quality Control Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-9(C) (1978). See Brief of the City of Albuquerque
at 4-5.
42. 94 N.M. 175, 608 P.2d 151 (1980).

Winter 1988]

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE RECONSIDERED

to the decision, but by virtue of this "minor departure from the customary
substantial evidence rule" the reviewing court may "act on other convincing
evidence in the record and may make its own findings based thereon."43
Justice Sosa dissented from the first opinion, and he also dissented from the
second on grounds which begin to define the debate in this struggle to better
articulate the substantial evidence standard. Justice Sosa believed "that the new
standard announced allows this court to substitute its judgement for the lower
court or administrative body with impunity."" Indeed, if one focuses on the last
sentence of the Garcia quote, noted above, substitution of judgment seems to
be invited whenever the court finds "other convincing evidence in the record."
On the other hand, the Garcia language, mandating that the evidence continue
to be viewed in the light most favorable to the agency, suggests just the opposite.
This language, coupled with Garcia's declaration that the distinction between
the traditional and the whole record standards is a minor one, leads one to believe
that extreme deference to agency fact-finding is still the order of the day.' Duke
City, therefore, created as much if not more difficulty than it resolved. It clearly
adopted the whole record standard, but left serious confusion about what that
new standard meant.
The final Duke City opinion says that the reviewing court: 1) must review the
entire record; 2) must not reweigh the evidence or reassign the preponderance
of evidence; 3) must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the decision;
but 4) remains free to act on other convincing evidence retaining the ability to
make its own findings." Unfortunately, in this unsuccessful effort to steer a
middle course in the debate over too much versus too little judicial interjection
into agency fact-finding, the court left us with palpable inconsistencies which have
created a doctrinal mess. First, how can a court view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the agency and still treat the record as a whole? Second, how
can the court consider the whole record without reweighing or reassigning the
preponderance of the evidence? Third, how can the court give deference to the
agency decision by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that
decision and also be free to make its own findings based on other convincing
evidence? These are the imponderables with which the courts and litigants were
left to grapple in the wake of Duke City.
B. The Threshold Requirement of a "Legal Residuum" of Competent
Evidence
After its substantial evidence discussion, the Duke City court also considered
the Company's challenge to the adequacy of the citizen testimony. The court of
appeals had in part relied on this testimony for its conclusion that there was
substantial evidence to support the Board's decision that the wood burning smoke
43. 101 N.M. at 294, 681 P.2d at 720 (quoting 94 N.M. at 177, 608 P.2d at 153.).
44. Id.
45. Indeed, if the commentators are correct that Garcia improperly applied the traditional standard
in the guise of the whole record standard, see supra note 19, then this latter reading of Duke City
ismore nearly correct.
46. 101 N.M. 291, 294, 681 P.2d 717,720 (1984).
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from Duke City's burner was injurious to health. Noting that such testimony
was general and unsworn, the court declared that New Mexico continues to
adhere to the "legal residuum rule" which requires that "an administrative action
be supported by some evidence that would be admissible in a jury trial." 7 The
court then noted that its adoption of the whole record standard did not negate
the legal residuum rule: "the substantial evidence rule and the whole record
standard. . . reaffirm the rule that some competent evidence is required to support
an action by an administrative agency which affects a substantial right." 48 Thus,
the court precluded the court of appeals on remand from using the unsworn,
general citizen testimony, including the unsworn testimony of an Espanola doctor,
as the basis for its factual determinations.
Despite this declaration of consistency between the legal residuum rule and
the substantial evidence test, the legal residuum rule is more properly viewed
as an exception to the substantial evidence test. Under a rigid application of the
rule, even if all of the evidence meets the test of substantiality-i.e., it is such
that "a reasonable mind might accept [it] as adequate to support a conclusion" 4 9the agency decision still must be reversed if there is not at least a residuum of
evidence legally admissible in a trial before a jury to support the decision.
Indeed, the legal residuum rule has been roundly condemned as undercutting
administrative flexibility and undermining the important principle that administrative agencies need to be more concerned with the probativeness of evidence
rather than its legal admissibility.5" In fact, in an earlier opinion, Trujillo v.
Employment Security Commission,5 the New Mexico Supreme Court had embraced those criticisms and stated that it was only retaining the legal residuum
rule "in those administrative proceedings where a substantial right, such as one's
ability to earn a livelihood, is at stake." 52 Thus, Trujillo generally repudiated
the legal residuum rule, while retaining it for what was then perceived as a
narrow category of personal right cases.
It previously has been suggested that "[wihen limited to those circumstances
where important personal rights are involved, the added formality [of the resid47. Id. at 295, 681 P.2d at 721. See e.g., Young v. Board of Pharmacy, 81 N.M. 8, 462 P.2d
139 (1969).
48. Id.
49. E.g., Wickerstam v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., 81 N.M. 188, 190, 464 P.2d 918, 920
(Ct. App. 1970) (the accepted definition of substantial evidence).
50. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 14.10 (1958); Utton, supra note 18,
at 109-17; 1980-81 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 23, at 43-44. The criticism of the legal
residuum rule is not, however, unanimous:
The criticisms referred to ignore the tendency of agencies to exercise little or no
control over the admission of evidence, which contributes to the elephantine record
in so many agency proceedings. Fear that the legal residuum rule may be invoked
leads agencies to insist on more careful presentation and examination of evidence.
B. ScHwARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.4, at 351 (2d ed. 1985).
51. 94 N.M. 343, 610 P.2d 747 (1980). This Trujillo opinion should not be confused with the
recent court of appeals decision by the same name which deals with the proper application of the
substantial evidence standard. For a discussion of the later Trujillo opinion, see infra text accompanying notes 90-108.
52. 94 N.M. at 344, 610 P.2d at 748. See also, Young v. Board of Pharmacy, 81 N.M. 5, 9,
462 P.2d 139, 142 (1969) (residuum rule is a sensible one where a person's livelihood is at stake).
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uum rule] ...properly serves to insure that more attention is paid to the protection of those important rights." 53 It particularly makes sense "when applied
to professional disciplinary proceedings and other adjudications involving important governmental entitlements which run to individuals." ' Its application
beyond those limitations, however, could seriously erode the substantial evidence
test.
Duke City ignores the general repudiation of the legal residuum rule contained
in Trujillo, and broadens the scope of its application well beyond the Trujillo
limitation. The Duke City court applied the legal residuum rule to preclude any
reliance on the unswom citizen testimony received during the "public participation" portion of the hearing to resolve the question whether smoke from the
mill was injurious to health.55
Although the Duke City court made passing reference to the "substantial right"
language in Trujillo, the fundamental personal rights involved in Trujillo (and
56
Young v. Board of Pharmacy,
upon which Trujillo relied,) were absent in Duke
City. Rather, Duke City only involved corporate economic rights. Also, Duke
City failed to recognize the generalized criticisms of the legal residuum rule
previously embraced in Trujillo. Duke City is, therefore, tantamount to a readoption of the legal residuum rule, 5" which is a sub silentio overruling of Trujillo.
Duke City, therefore, leaves us with uncertainty about the meaning and scope
of the whole record substantial evidence standard. It also tells us that the substantiality of the evidence under any reading of that test may be irrelevant if the
agency decision is not based on at least a residuum of legally admissible evidence
under the rules of evidence.
"

III. THE POST-DUKE CITY SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The supreme court's post-Duke City substantial evidence decisions brought
no resolution to the duality contained in that opinion.Rather, the duality remains
in Duke City's progeny, allowing the justices to use either the deferential "inthe-light-most-favorable-to-the-decision" aspect of the case to affirm some agency
decisions, or the less deferential "viewing-all-the-evidence-to-see-if-on-balanceit-supports-the-decision" aspect of the case to overturn others.
8
Gas Company of New Mexico v. New Mexico Public Service Commission,1
53. 1980-81 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 23, at 44.
54. 1983-84 Administrative Law Survey, 15 N.M.L. REv. 119, 142 (1985).
Since disciplinary proceedings most often involve the application of law to past facts to resolve
questions akin to guilt and innocence in the criminal sphere, and since the consequences are often
penal-like, there is a good argument for the added protection of the rules of evidence.
55. It also found that the unsworn testimony offered by an Espanola physician "was general rather
than specific," and that in his recitation to source material he "did not relate to or apply that material
to the facts of this case." 101 N.M. at 295, 681 P.2d at 721. The lay witnesses and the doctor
"testified that smoke from the burner caused asthma attacks and irritation of eyes, nose and throat."
Id.
56. 81 N.M. 5, 462 P.2d 139 (1969).
57. If the legal residuum rule applies to bar reliance on all unswom citizen testimony in the
context of Duke City it is hard to articulate the kind of case where the legal residuum rule would
not apply.
58. 100 N.M. 740, 676 P.2d 817 (1984).
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the first post-Duke City substantial evidence case decided by the supreme court,
provided no help whatsoever. In that case the court affirmed a Public Service
Commission order imputing as income to the Gas Company a certain percentage
of the reserve of the Company's affiliate, thereby reducing the cost of gas charged
to utility customers. In doing so it merely referenced the Duke City whole record
standard, and concluded, without analysis, that the standard had been met.59
That case was followed by Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. New Mexico State
Corporation Commission,60 where the court affirmed the Corporation Commission's refusal to grant a state-wide certificate to a common carrier of petroleum
products. In doing so, the court properly acknowledged that whole record review6
"is not a review limited to those findings most favorable to the agency order." 1
Again, however, it gave us no guidance on how the standard was to be applied,
noting only its ultimate conclusion that "a review of the record reveals that the
Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence. ' 62 Groendyke
Transport, therefore, only hinted that the Duke City standard was inherently
inconsistent with the "light most favorable" test.
Following Groendyke Transport, the court decided Mutz v. Municipal Boundary Commission,63 which upheld a municipal boundary commission's order of
annexation against a landowner's protest. The district court had upheld the
commission under the pre-Duke City standard. The supreme court affirmed, citing
Duke City, and stating that it had examined the whole record and also viewed
"the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission's decision."' Thus,
in contrast to Groendyke Transport, Mutz fell on the more deferential "lightmost-favorable" side of the line. Similarly, in Attorney General v. New Mexico
Public Service Commission,65 deference was afforded the Public Service Commission's rate-making decision, requiring affirmance of that decision. In that
case the court again claimed adherence to the Duke City whole record standard,
and declared that under that standard it was required to view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Commission's decision.'6 In Jimenez v. Department
of Corrections,67 the court, in a split decision, affirmed the State Personnel
Board's order upholding the Department's termination of Mr. Jimenez for negligent performance of his duties as a corrections officer. The majority applied
the Duke City whole record standard with its deferential "light-most-favorable"
gloss. The majority's review of the evidence persuaded it that 6there was substantial evidence to support the agency decision to fire Jimenez. 1
59. See also Gonzales v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 102 N.M. 529, 697 P.2d 948 (1985) (merely
referencing Duke City's whole record standard).
60. 101 N.M. 470, 684 P.2d 1135 (1984).
61. Id. at 477, 684 P.2d at 1142.
62. Id. Indeed, Duke City itself suffers from this same difficulty. There was no application of
the new whole record standard in that case because the basis for the decision was the failure of the
court of appeals to apply the correct legal standard to the determination of the question whether the
wood smoke was injurious to health. See supra note 35.
63. 101 N.M. 694, 688 P.2d 12 (1984).
64. Id. at 699, 688 P.2d at 17.
65. 101 N.M. 549, 685 P.2d 957 (1984).
66. Id. at 553, 685 P.2d at 961.
67. 101 N.M. 795, 689 P.2d 1266 (1984).
68. Id. at 796-97, 689 P.2d at 1267-68.
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Jimenez was the guard on duty in Tower I of the State Penitentiary on the
night an escape took place. Ten inmates escaped just prior to Jimenez's coming
on duty, but an eleventh, Harmon Ellis, made his escape a half hour after Jimenez
began his duty. The majority were persuaded that there was substantial evidence
that Jimenez neglected his duty with respect to Ellis' escape, and relied on the
following facts: that Ellis' escape took place across an open space in front of
Tower 1; that there was an unobstructed view of that space from Tower 1; that
the tower was equipped with a spot light; that Ellis would have been observable
from Tower I while he was pacing up and down the perimeter fence which was
illuminated; and that even if Ellis escaped while Jimenez was releasing members
of a visiting basketball team, the mirror in the tower would have enabled Jimenez
to detect activity behind him.69
The dissenting justices, on the other hand, stressed the "on balance" evaluation
of the whole record, which they believed the Duke City standard required.7" The
dissenters engaged in their own detailed review of the evidence. They focused
first on the fact that the warden had recommended firing Jimenez "based on the
mass escape of eleven inmates," before it was learned that ten of the eleven had
escaped before Jimenez came on duty.7' They also emphasized that Jimenez
checked out the basketball team "through a gate adjacent to his tower assignment." 72 Particularly persuasive to the dissenters were the facts that the record
nowhere contained an explanation of how the mirror, located in the tower, could
have been of any assistance to Jimenez when he was occupied at the gate adjacent
to the tower, and that the hearing officer had found that Jimenez could not have
seen the escape while engaged in other duties.73 These facts led them to conclude
that "on balance" the evidence against neglect "outweighs any evidence of
negligence or inefficient performance on the part of Jimenez." 74
69. Id. at 797, 689 P.2d at 1268.
70. Id. at 797, 689 P.2d at 1268 (Walters, J., dissenting, joined by Sosa, S.J.) Justice Sosa had
dissented from Duke City because he thought it allowed too broad a scope of judicial review, but
he was willing to apply its broader standard to protect the individual rights involved in this case.
71. Id. at 797, 689 P.2d at 1268.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. id. at 798, 689 P.2d at 1269. At this juncture in its analysis the dissent does suggest that the
findings of the district court-which had overturned the administrative decision as lacking substantial
evidence-must be viewed in the light most favorable to the successful party. This unfortunate
confusion of the standard applicable to the review of judicial decisions, as opposed to the Duke City
standard, which applies to judicial review of administrative decisions, slightly blurs what would
otherwise stand as a clear example of the application of the "on-balance", less deferential strain in
the Duke City opinion.
This concern with the subsequent fact-finding of the district court, and the suggestion that it be
given more deference than the initial fact finding of the agency appears out of step with the longstanding view of the supreme court that in making its substantial evidence review, after a similar
review by a lower court, it must "conduct the same review as the district court." Padilla v. Real
Estate Comm'n, 106 N.M. 96, 97, 739 P.2d 965, 966 (1987); see Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. New
Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 101 N.M. 470, 477, 684 P.2d 1135, 1142 (1984); Lloyd McKee
Motors v. State Corp. Comm'n, 93 N.M. 539, 602 P.2d 1026 (1979). While the court's articulation
of this repetitive second-tier judicial review is, perhaps, subject to criticism as unnecessary, wasteful
of judicial resources, and an encouragement to forum-shopping, see text accompanying notes 14852, the implication in the Jimenez dissent that in carrying out its subsequent substantial evidence
review the supreme court should afford more deference to the district court fact-finding than the
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Jimenez, therefore, provides us with a reasoned application of the divergent
standards contained in Duke City. Indeed, it is the reasoned application by both
the majority and the dissent which helps us to see clearly the duality of Duke
City, and that the two inconsistent strains in the case can often lead to disparate
results.
The next two supreme court cases on the subject added nothing to our understanding of the Duke City dilemma. Alonzo v. New Mexico Employment
Security Department 5 ostensibly applied the whole record standard, without
reference to either the "light-most-favorable" or "on-balance" glosses on that
standard. It did engender a dissent, but the justices' debate in that case was over
the legal definition of the word "misconduct" in the Unemployment Compensation Act,76 rather than a disagreement over the facts. Similarly, in State ex rel.
Harkleroad v. New Mexico State Police Board,77 the court upheld an agency
decision under the whole record standard, without a reasoned application which
would allow us to see which aspect of Duke City predominated.
Three of the remaining opinions on this subject78 are not so neutral, although
collectively they provide no more certain resolution to the essential dilemma
than the cases that preceded them. In Elliott v. New Mexico Real Estate Commission,79 and New Mexico Industrial Energy Consumers v. New Mexico Public
Service Commission," the court affirmed agency decisions under the whole record
standard, indicating that it was bound to view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the decision."' On the other hand, in Grauerholtz v. New Mexico
agency fact-finding seems to be a perverse middle ground. If a second-tier substantial evidence
review is deemed advisable, then it should be a full-blown review as suggested by the Padillal
Groendyke TransportlLloyd McKee Motors standard. If it is unnecessary or inadvisable, then a
different standard, which better serves as a check on the first reviewing court, rather than the agency,
is in order. See infra text accompanying notes 148-52 and 172.
75. 101 N.M. 770, 689 P.2d 286 (1984).
76. Alonzo, a full-time office clerk at Baldridge Lumber Company, sometimes "helped out" at
the cash register. On one occasion she was told by her supervisor to wear the Company smock while
at the register. Wearing the smock was company policy with respect to cash register employees.
When she failed to wear it the next time she worked the cash register, she was discharged. 101
N.M. at 770, 689 P.2d at 286.
The majority reversed the agency decision that she was ineligible for unemployment benefits
because, in its view, the single failure to wear the smock did not meet the established test of
misconduct, which requires "willful or wanton disregard of an employer's interests." Id. (quoting,
Mitchell v. Lovington Good Samaritan Center, Inc., 89 N.M. 575, 577, 555 P.2d 696, 698 (1976)).
The dissenting justices, on the other hand, were equally convinced that Alonzo's willful refusal to
obey the order of her employer was an act of insubordination, and fell within the Mitchell definition
of misconduct. 101 N.M. at 772, 689 P.2d at 288 (Stowers, J., dissenting).
77. 103 N.M. 270, 705 P.2d 676 (1985).
78. In another case, Warren v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 104 N.M. 518, 724 P.2d 227 (1986),
the court affirmed a denial of unemployment benefits under the whole record standard, without
reference to more.
79. 103 N.M. 273, 705 P.2d 679 (1985).
80. 104 N.M. 565, 725 P.2d 244 (1986).
8 1. Elliott, which involved the affirmation of the Real Estate Commission's suspension of Elliott's
broker's license, did evoke a dissent, but only on the question of whether the Commission had
jurisdiction to review Elliott's conduct in this case. The dissenters were of the opinion that Elliott
was only involved as an attomey-in-fact for the sale of an interest in a real estate contract; that such
a transaction was not a sale of real estate within the meaning of the relevant statute; and that therefore
the Real Estate Commission had no jurisdiction. 103 N.M. 273, 276, 705 P.2d 679, 682 (1985)
(Walters, J, dissenting).
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Labor Commission,8 2 the court upheld a Labor Commissioner determination that
a subcontractor was required to pay additional wages under the Public Works
Minimum Wage Act, reciting that portion of Duke City which requires an "onbalance" approach to the evidence. Again, in none of these cases did the court
treat us to a reasoned application of the standard, but merely recited that after
a review of the record, it found substantial evidence support for the Commission's
decision.
The supreme court has had an occasion to deal with the Duke City standard
since the court of appeals sought to resolve the Duke City duality by adopting
the "on balance" view of the case. 83 Nonetheless, the supreme court sidestepped
the issue by neatly bowing in each direction at the same time. In NationalCouncil
on CompensationInsurance v. New Mexico State CorporationCommission,s the
court upheld a district court affirmance of the Corporation Commission's denial
of a workers' compensation insurance premium increase. In doing so the court
had to deal with a substantial evidence claim, necessitating articulation of the
Duke City standard. Again, the court began by claiming that it was compelled
to view "the evidence in the light most favorable to the agency decision. " 5 The
court went on to suggest that such an approach does not allow the court to "view
favorable evidence with total disregard to contravening evidence." 86 This small
bow in the direction of the "on balance" approach was then accentuated by the
court's declaration that "[n]o part of the evidence may be exclusively relied
upon if it would be unreasonable to do so." 7
The post-Duke City supreme court decisions thus fail to resolve what the whole
record standard is supposed to mean. They also fail to give us any coherent view
of how the standard is to be applied, although in one case the majority and
dissenting opinions demonstrated how a reasoned application of the two existing
strains in Duke City could lead to disparate results in a given case.
The Duke City duality prevents the substantial evidence test from serving as
a standard which meaningfully establishes the boundary of judicial intervention
into administrative agency fact-finding. On the other hand, if the substantial
evidence standard is viewed only as a convenient device for framing decisions
which are rooted more in a concern for the nature of the rights being affected
by the given decision, or the quality of the agency process utilized in a given
case, then the duality may prove useful in a perverse sort of way. It allows the
court to choose "the light most favorable" line to uphold agency decisions which
do not trammel fundamental personal rights, or which are arrived at by full and
fair procedures, while reserving the "on balance" line to overturn those decisions
which do touch upon personal, fundamental rights, or which are arrived at through
suspect process.88
82. 104 N.M. 674, 726 P.2d 351 (1986).
83. See infra text accompanying notes 89-107.
84. 107 N.M. 278, 756 P.2d 558 (1988).
85. Id. at 398, 756 P.2d at 558 (citing Wolfley v. Real Estate Comm'n, 100 N.M. 187, 668 P.2d
303 (1983)), a pre-Duke City case.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Admittedly, most judicial review statutes contain additional standards of review-requiring
reversal of agency decisions which are "arbitrary and capricious," or "otherwise not in accordance
with law." See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-38-28(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1986) (appeals from County
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Indeed, both of these considerations-the nature of the right affected, and the
quality of the agency decisionmaking process-are important policy considerations which necessarily underlie judicial review of fact-based agency adjudication. It is, therefore, appropriate that these policy considerations drive the
result in the marginal substantial evidence decisions. But, these considerations
come into play in the application of the substantial evidence standard; they do
not excuse the court from failing to articulate a clear standard which can then
be applied with an eye toward these underlying policies.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ENTERS THE FRAY
In its early post-Duke City substantial evidence cases the court of appeals gave
scant attention to the internal inconsistency of that opinion.89 In two early 1987
opinions, however, the court grappled with the Duke City duality. In doing so,
it appropriately settled part of the struggle, while sowing the seeds for yet more
intractable problems in the application of the substantial evidence standard to
the review of administrative agency fact-finding.
A. The "On-Balance" Resolution of the Duke-City Dilemma
In Trujillo v. Employment Security Department,' the court of appeals was
faced with what seemed a pedestrian administrative appeal. Trujillo and a group
of his fellow workers had been dismissed from their employment for failure to
Valuation Protest Boards); id. § 27-3-4(F) (1978) (Public Assistance Appeals Act); id. § 12-8-22
(1978) (APA). These additional standards allow for review of legally deficient procedure. What may
have affected the substantial evidence review in Jimenez, and other cases like it, however, is a
procedural weakness which does not rise to the level of a legally defective process.
It has been suggested elsewhere that the courts have on occasion confused the various standards
of review contained in judicial review statutes. See, e.g., 1980-81 AdministrativeLaw Survey, supra
note 23, at 58-60. While the three accepted standards-substantial evidence, arbitrary and capricious
and otherwise not in accordance with law-do in fact serve different functions and ought to be
subject to separate and discrete analysis, that topic is well beyond the scope of this article.
89. The early post-Duke City substantial evidence cases decided by the court of appeals are as
unhelpful as those decided by the supreme court. In Muckey v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs.,
102 N.M. 265, 694 P.2d 521 (Ct. App. 1985), the court applied the "light most favorable" standard
from Garcia to uphold a welfare department denial of benefits. Muckey was followed by yet another
welfare case, Gutierrez v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 102 N.M. 751, 700 P.2d 654
(1985), in which the court again applied the "light most favorable" standard to affirm an agency
decision. Neither case cites Duke City, placing their entire reliance on Garcia, which was also a
welfare case.
Muckey and Gutierrez were followed by Tapia v. City of Albuquerque, 104 N.M. 117, 717 P.2d
93 (Ct. App. 1985), in which the court upheld an administrative personnel decision. The Tapia court
seemed to touch all the bases. It acknowledged the whole record standard of Duke City, declared
that it must review the evidence in the "light most favorable" to the agency decision, and then
concluded that "on balance" there was substantial evidence to support the agency decision.
The two following cases both involved unemployment compensation appeals. In Hinojasa v.
Employment Sec. Dep't, 105 N.M. 212, 730 P.2d 1194 (Ct. App. 1986), the court affirmed an
agency decision applying the "light most favorable" standard, and in Ortiz v. Employment Sec.
Dep't, 105 N.M. 313, 731 P.2d 1357 (Ct. App. 1986), the court merely acknowledged that it was
applying the whole record standard from Duke City. See also, Kleinberg v. Board of Educ., 107
N.M. 38, 751 P.2d 722 (Ct. App. 1988); Board of Educ. v. New Mexico State Bd. of Educ., 106
N.M. 129, 740 P.2d 123 (Ct. App. 1987) (later cases merely acknowledging the new Duke City
standard).
90. 105 N.M. 467, 734 P.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1987).
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report for overtime duty.9' The Employment Security Department denied their
claim for unemployment benefits, finding them ineligible because they had been
dismissed for misconduct. On certiorari,92 the district court reversed and granted
an award of benefits to the employees. On appeal the court of appeals was
confronted with a straightforward substantial evidence question, complicated
somewhat by the fact that, pursuant to the rule on certiorari, the district court
had substituted its own findings and conclusions for those of the agency.93 The
Department framed the issue on appeal in terms of whether "the trial court
abused its discretion in overturning the decision of ESD and in adopting findings
of fact and conclusions of law contrary to those found by the administrative
agency."'
The court first turned to the standard of review it needed to apply--the Duke
City whole record standard-and found itself caught between the "on-balance"
and the "most favorable light" aspects of that case in determining whether it
was appropriate for the district court to enter its own findings and conclusions.
The court grappled with what it considered to be two sources of confusion in
Duke City. First, the Trujillo court found that Duke City had relied on New
95
Mexico Human Services Department v. Garcia
for the proposition that the
reviewing court may act on other convincing evidence and may enter its own
findings. The court found, however, that Duke City had failed to make clear that
Garciaonly endorsed substitution of court findings for those of the agency when
the agency's findings were not supported by substantial evidence.' Second, the
court directly confronted the inconsistency between whole record review and the
"most favorable light" standards, both of which had been endorsed in Duke
City. The court found, through its analysis of Duke City and its supreme court
progeny,97 that here, too, "Garcia may be a root cause of confusion." 98 Since
91. Appellees were employees of Associated Grocers of Colorado who were working the noon
to 8:30 p.m. shift. They had been asked to work overtime shortly before the shift ended, and refused,
as was their right, because the employer's request had not been timely under the provisions of their
union contract. Just before the end of the shift the supervisor met with them in what he testified
was an attempt to draft them for overtime work, which he had the right to do under the contract in
emergency situations. Id. at 469 and 472, 734 P.2d at 246 and 250.
The supervisor testified that he told them he was drafting them, that he wanted them back at 4:30
a.m, that the employees understood what he had said, and that there was no confusion or misunderstanding. The three employees who testified, however, said they and others were confused. They
understood the supervisor to say that some employees were going to be called to come in at 4:30
a.m., and since they were not called they did not report. Id. at 468, 734 P.2d at 246.
92. Certiorari review to the district court from decisions of the Employment Security Department
is specifically provided for by N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-8 (1978), and the procedures therefore are
delineated in N.M.R. Ctv. P. 1-081(C).
93. Section 51-1-8(M) provides for district court review "both upon the law and the facts," and
Rule 81(C)(4) specifically provides that in doing so the "district court shall make findings of fact
and conclusions of law and enter judgment therein upon the merits."
94. 105 N.M. at 468, 734 P.2d at 246.
95. 94 N.M. 175, 608 P.2d 151 (1980).
96. Id. at 177, 608 P.2d at 153. See also, Abernathy v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 93 N.M.
71, 596 P.2d 514 (1979).
97. In its review of the post-Duke City supreme court cases dealing with substantial evidence,
the court found that most of the "light most favorable" cases had relied either directly or indirectly
on Garcia. See 105 N.M. at 470, 734 P.2d at 248.
98. Id. The Trujillo court was both patently correct in its analysis and more than kind in its
understatement of the problem. After all, it was the removal of the critical paragraph rejecting the
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Garcia made no reference to Universal Camera, and since the supreme court
had reiterated in Grauerhotz v. New Mexico Labor & Industrial Commission,"
that in Duke City "we adopted the whole record review announced in Universal
Camera,""'' the court of appeals was confident in concluding that it is the "on
balance" aspect of the standard, found in Universal Camera rather than the
"most favorable light" aspect of the standard which must govern whole record
review under Duke City."'
The court of appeals then considered the application of the on-balance whole
record standard to the facts before it. Rather than viewing the misconduct question
as a legal question, 2 the court found it to be a factual question which was the
subject of conflicting testimony-the testimony of the employees that they were
confused about the overtime demand, contrasted with the testimony of the supervisor that his instructions were explicit and not confusing. Without elaborating
on the specific testimony before it, the court concluded that the district court
finding of employee confusion was in error because the evidence was conflicting
and "would have supported conflicting conclusions."' 0 3 Under any view of the
standard, however, the court found comfort in the rubric that "[iut is not the
function of reviewing courts to determine the credibility of witnesses."" On
this basis the appeals court reversed the decision of the district court holding
that "the trial court improperly reweighed the evidence and substituted its judgment for that of the administrative agency." 0 5
Trujillo thus correctly eliminated the Duke City confusion over the articulation
of the whole record standard. In doing so, however, it failed to fully elaborate
the facts before it, as the supreme court had failed to do in most of its postDuke City cases. Indeed, by its quick resort to the rule that reviewing courts
may not evaluate credibility, the court of appeals may have done little more than
substitute that rubric for the "light most favorable" test which it seemingly
rejected. If the court's holding means that whenever there is conflicting testimony,
then agencies can make any reasonable finding free from meaningful judicial
review, then indeed the evaluation of credibility rubric is merely another for"light most favorable" language, in its initial Duke City opinion, and the substitution of the Garcia
paragraph in its stead, which led the supreme court to create the muddle in the first place. See supra
text accompanying notes 36-46.
99. 104 N.M. 674, 726 P.2d 351 (1986).
100. Id. at 676, 726 P.2d at 353.
101. Indeed, even a cursory analysis of Universal Camera makes clear that the United States
Supreme Court viewed the whole record standard as rejecting the "light most favorable" approach
and requiring an "on balance" approach to judicial review of the evidence. See infra note 136.
102. The employees had relied on the "single isolated incident" exception to the misconduct
definition, seemingly applied by the supreme court in Alonzo v. New Mexico Employment Sec.
Dep't, 101 N.M. 770, 689 P.2d 286 (1984) more as a matter of law than of fact. See supra text
accompanying notes 75-76.
103. 105 N.M. at 471, 734 P.2d at 249. The court relied on UniversalCamera for the proposition
that the whole record standard does not "mean that .. .a court may displace the ... [agency's]
choice between two fairly conflicting views." 340 U.S. at 488.
104. 107 N.M. at 472, 734 P.2d at 250. It is ironic that the court, after criticizing Garcia in the
portion of its opinion on the substantial evidence test then resorted to Garcia as support for the
proposition that a reviewing court should not engage in evaluating the credibility of witnesses.
105. Id. at 472, 734 P.2d at 250.
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mulation of the "light most favorable" standard. If, on the other hand, the case
truly involved the judging of the witnesses' credibility,"o and the agency accepted
one witness' testimony over another because it judged the testimony of one more
credible, then the principle makes sense. In that latter instance, however, the
reviewing court must insist that the agency actually evaluate credibility and state
the basis for its credibility evaluation. "Credibility" should not become a makeweight for insulating agency decisions from judicial review in the myriad of
cases in which there is conflicting evidence.
By failing to engage in the reasoned application of its articulated standard,
the Trujillo court failed to give us any guidance in this regard. Instead, we are
left with the disquieting feeling that credibility was not at all the basis for the
agency decision in this case. Assuming that both the supervisor and the employees
were honest and sincere in their testimony, and equally credible to a fair and
impartial decisionmaker, °7 we are left with a supervisor who thought he was
clear in what he said to his employees, and some employees who failed to
understand those instructions. In that situation, it is hard to find "misconduct"
under the settled definition of that term," 8 and the decision of the district court
appears more correct than that of the agency.
The point here, of course, is not whether the district court rather than the
court of appeals was correct in this particular case, but rather, how reasoned
application of the substantial evidence test is absolutely essential to our understanding of the test and how it should be applied in the future. Perhaps, then,
the real difficulty in this whole controversy is that so much judicial attention has
been focused on the articulationof the whole record standard, with the implicit
assumption that once we get it right, its application would be relatively straight106. In this case the court of appeals did not indicate that the testimony of the supervisor was
more credible than that of the employees, nor was there any indication that credibility of the witnesses
was critical to either the agency or the lower court.
107. Just a brief application of the articulated standard to the facts of record by the reviewing
court is all that would be required to demonstrate the falseness of this assumption. If, of course,
that cannot be done because the assumption is correct, then that would demonstrate that the issue
here was not really a matter of credibility, and that the credibility rubric was not the correct basis
for the decision.
Of course, a reviewing court may do the greatest service to the respective roles of agency and
court when, in those instances where the basis of the agency decision is unclear, it remands to the
agency to require such clarification. See Akel v. New Mexico Human Services Dep't, 106 N.M.
749 P.2d 1120 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 74, 752 P.2d 789 (1988) (hearing officer's
decision must adequately reflect the basis for his determination and the reasoning used in arriving
at such a determination so that the appellate court may perform its review function.); Cibola Energy
Corp. v. Roselli, 105 N.M. 774, 776, 737 P.2d 555, 557 (Ct. App. 1987) ("For purposes of judicial
review, the order must, at least, indicate the reasoning of the board and the basis on which it acted."
105 N.M. at 778, 737 P.2d at 559, citing First Bank v. Bernalillo Count Valuation Protest Bd., 90
N.M. 110, 560 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1977), quoting DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,§ 16.05 at 444
(1958)).
108. "[M]isconduct"... is limited to conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard
of an employer's interests as is found in deliberate violations. . . . On the other
hand mere. . . failure in good performance as the result of. . .ordinary negligence
in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be
deemed "misconduct" within the meaning of the statute.
Mitchell v. Lovington Good Samaritan Center, Inc., 89 N.M. 575, 577, 555 P.2d 696, 698 (1976).
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forward. The fact, of course, is that articulation of any legal standard only takes
us so far-the real difficulty, and the judicial art if you will, is in a reasoned
application of the standard with a judicial eye on the values which the standard
was designed to serve.
B. The Seeds of Further Difficulties-Allowing Independent Findings
by the Reviewing Court
In addition to the disquiet with which we are left by the Trujillo court's failure
to give us any sense of reasoned application of the whole record standard, that
case also reiterated a pre-Duke City standard which may undermine much of the
recent effort of our appellate courts to readjust the substantial evidence standard
of review. Truillo made clear that a reviewing court may substitute its judgment
for that of the agency-making findings and conclusions independent of those
of the agency-when the reviewing court finds that the agency decision is not
supported by substantial evidence." As a general principle, this, too, is very
troubling.
The purpose of the substantial evidence test is to help define the role of the
reviewing court, so that the court can properly perform its reviewing function
without undermining the essential fact-finding role of adjudicatory agencies. If
the court of appeals' substitution of judgment principle is generally applied when
there is not substantial evidence to support the agency decision, however, it will
undermine agency fact-finding. Agency fact-finding will be deferred to only if
the agency gets it right the first time. If, however, the agency gets it wrongmakes a decision unsupported by substantial evidence-then the application of
the substituted judgment principle means that the reviewing court is free to
sidestep the agency and substitute its fact-finding abilities for those of the agency.
Deference to agency fact-finding then would become only a sometime principleapplicable when the agency gets it right, and inapplicable when the agency gets
it wrong.

Not only would such a principle undermine agency fact-finding in those instances when the agency makes an erroneous decision, but it would also eliminate
one of the corollary values of judicial review of fact-finding-instructing the
agency on the deficiencies in its fact-finding processes. When a reviewing court
reverses an agency decision as unsupported by substantial evidence in the record
as a whole, and does so by a reasoned application of the standard to the facts
in the particular case, the court provides helpful guidance to the agency about
its process of resolving factual disputes. Reversals with remands, rather than
substituted findings and conclusions," o will allow the agency to engage in better
109. Neither Universal Camera nor Duke City ... changed the standard of review so
as to permit the reviewing court to enter its own findings if the administrative
[Tihe independent
agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence ....
findings by the reviewing court are authorized if the Board's findings, after considering all conflicting evidence, are unsupported by substantial evidence.
105 N.M. at 469-470, 734 P.2d at 247-48.
110. Our appellate courts have been less than consistent in this regard. Compare Ernest W. Hahn,
Inc. v. County Assessor for Bernalillo County, 92 N.M. 609, 592 P.2d 965 (1978) (reversed and
remanded to Valuation Protest Board with directions to reassess property in accordance with the
standards set out in the opinion), with Cibola Energy Corp. v. Roselli, 105 N.M. 774, 737 P.2d
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fact-finding the second time around, and help guide the agency to better factfinding in the future. General application of the substituted judgement principle
in all situations when the agency decision is not supported by substantial evidence
would frustrate this important, if secondary, basis for judicial review of agency
fact-finding under the whole record standard.
In fact, the application of the substituted judgment principle in cases like
Trujillo is appropriate. It is appropriate in those cases, however, not because it
represents a sound administrative law principle, but rather, because the statute
and supreme court rule governing judicial review of Employment Security Department decisions mandate such treatment. The statute governing appellate
review of Department decisions specifically provides that the decision "may be
reviewed both upon the law and the facts by the district court . . . upon certiorari."'.. The procedural rules for the district court then provide the relevant
procedural mechanism for that review, including the direction that the "court
shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law and enter judgment therein
upon the merits."" 2
Indeed, in M.R. Prestridge Lumber Co. v. Employment Security Commission,"'3 an early appellate review case decided under this statute/rule configuration, the supreme court expressly rejected the application of traditional substantial
evidence review. Given the specific wording of the statute and implementing
rule, the court concluded that "the responsibility of making correct findings rests
with the district court and it is not to be hampered or embarrassed in the performance of this duty by the findings of the Commission.""4
More than a decade later, in Wilson v. Employment Security Commission,"5
the court retreated from that portion of PrestridgeLumber and adopted the current
construction of the judicial review scheme found in the Unemployment Compensation Act (UCA) and its implementing court rule. Recognizing that judicial
review of agency decisions is usually a matter of statutory construction, the court
in Wilson concluded that this statutory/rule scheme embodies a modified substantial evidence review: "The trial court shall adopt as its own such of the
Commission's findings of fact as it determines to be supported by substantial
evidence. . . . [With respect to those findings which are not substantially supported] the district court shall make its own findings of fact, conclusions of law
and decision ...
6
Substitution of judgment in unemployment compensation appeals is, therefore,
rooted in the specific provisions of the controlling statute and court rule. In that
context the reviewing court has no choice but to apply that standard whenever
555 (Ct. App. 1987) (reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Cibola's
valuations). See generally, 1983-84 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54, at 147-48.
111. N.M. STAT. ANN. §51-1-8(M) (1978).
112. N.M.R. Civ. P. 1-081(C)(4).
113. 50 N.M. 309, 176 P.2d 190 (1947).
114. Id. at 327, 176 P.2d at 198. The court noted that this primary duty of the district court to
make findings did not mean that the court must ignore the findings of the agency. Rather, the court
should "follow the Commission's findings in making its own, save where the evidence clearly
preponderates against them." Id. (emphasis added.)
115. 74 N.M. 3, 389 P.2d 855 (1964).
116. Id. at 8, 389 P.2d at 858.
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it finds decisions of the Employment Security Department are unsupported by
substantial evidence. " 7
The UCA standard is a troublesome standard, however, because it represents
a confused view of the role of court and agency where fact-finding is concerned.
On the one hand, it attempts a deferential judicial posture toward agency factfinding so long as the agency's facts are supported by substantial evidence. Once
the court concludes that the agency's factual determinations are not sufficiently
supported, however, the UCA standard then totally rejects any deference to the
agency fact-finding process, and instead requires the court to be the ultimate
decider of the facts. The court then has the right, one supposes, to reweigh the
evidence, judge the credibility of the witnesses, and the like. In that instance
the Department merely becomes a hearing officer to the district court--developing
all of the evidence upon which the decision will be made, but leaving the decision
to the district court based upon the administrative record. While it is hard to
envision any rational justification for such a scheme of judicial review," 8 that
is how the will of the legislature in this area has been interpreted.
It is questionable whether the legislature purposefully chose the judicial review
mechanism in unemployment compensation cases." 9 Even if it did, however,
there is absolutely no reason for the court to graft the tortured unemployment
compensation review scheme onto the substantial evidence review standard contained in the vast majority of statutes providing for judicial review. This is
especially so when many of our agencies are involved in complex fact-finding
which requires the application of agency expertise, and where the nature of much
117. See, e.g., Alonzo v. New Mexico Employment Sec. Dep't, 101 N.M. 770, 689 P.2d 286
(1984); Abernathy v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 93 N.M. 71, 596 P.2d 514 (1979); Trujillo v.
Employment Sec. Dep't, 105 N.M. 467, 734 P.2d 245 (Ct. App. 1987).
118. The PrestridgeLumber Co. interpretation-requiring independent findings and conclusions
by the district court-fully transformed the district courts into agency decisionmakers, with the
Commission serving merely as the hearing officer. While that result may have been more consistent
with a literal reading of the statute and court rule, such a result certainly placed an additional burden
on the district courts, while also expressing a lack of confidence in agency fact-finding.
The Wilson interpretation, on the other hand, represents a compromise of sorts. By requiring
district court deference to agency decisions which are correct, and only mandating independent factfinding by the court when it finds the agency decision not supported by substantial evidence, the
Wilson view somewhat enhances the agency role, while also somewhat controlling the expenditure
of judicial decisionmaking resources.
If one were searching for a rationale to support the Wilson interpretation, it might lie in the fact
that most of the contested unemployment compensation decisions involve a determination of whether
the employee was dismissed for "misconduct" within the meaning of the Act. Such a determination
does not involve difficult questions which lie within the expertise of the agency; indeed, such an
application of law to fact is precisely the sort of question and involves just the sort of evidence,
with which our civil courts deal on a regular basis. The two-step judicial review scheme--deferential
review to see if the decision is supported by substantial evidence, followed by more intensive full
decisionmaking if the findings are not so supported--could, therefore, be justified as a system which
allows the agencies to alleviate the work load of courts, but keeps the courts available as the ultimate
decisionmakers on matters within their own experience and expertise when it is clear that the agency
has not done the job.
119. See Duke City Lumber Co. v. New Mexico Envtl. Improvement Bd., 101 N.M. 301, 304,
661 P.2d 727, 730 (Ct. App. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 101 N.M. 291, 681 P.2d 717 (1984)
("it is not clear ... why the legislature requires different standards of review for different administrative agencies.").
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of our governmental regulation requires consistency of application to insure an
orderly scheme of regulation.
Regrettably, the general discussion of substituted judgment in Trujillo has led
to just such a generalized application, 2 thereby threatening to undermine the
delicate balance between the protection of agency fact-finding and meaningful
judicial review, which the Duke City formulation of the whole record standard
was designed to foster. Just a few short months after Trujillo, in Cibola Energy
Corporationv. Roselli,l2' the court of appeals overturned a decision of a local
agency as unsupported by substantial evidence, and then went on to make its
own independent decision.
Cibola Energy Corporationinvolved an appeal by Cibola Energy Corporation
from a decision of the Valencia County Protest Board fixing the valuation of
certain property owned by Cibola. 22
' The County Assessor valued the lands, and
Cibola protested those assessments to the Board. While the Board rejected the
Assessor's valuation as too high, it valued the lands in excess of Cibola's
proposed valuation, and from that final Board decision, Cibola appealed.
The Cibola court first noted that under the applicable statute, the decision of
the Board is to be set aside if it is "not supported by substantial evidence in the
record taken as a whole." 23
' The court correctly reasoned that this statute required
it to apply the Duke City standard, which, based on Trujillo and Groendyke
Transport, required the court to determine, whether "on balance the agency's
decision was supported by substantial evidence."' 24 Thus, the Cibola Energy
court left no doubt that the court of appeals had firmly adopted the "on-balance"
view of Duke City. After applying the "on-balance" standard to the facts before
it, 2' the court concluded that the Board's findings were not supported by substantial evidence based on the record as a whole.' 26
Such a conclusion, under the terms of the applicable judicial review statute'27
compelled the court to reverse the decision of the Board. At that juncture sound
120. In fairness it should be pointed out that the root of the evil is Garcia, a non-unemployment
compensation case, in which the supreme court borrowed the substituted judgment principle from
the unemployment compensation field, and, in unsupported dicta, said it would apply in Human
Services Department decisions. See 94 N.M. at 177, 608 P.2d at 153.
121. 105 N.M. 774, 737 P.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1987).
122. The properties involved were initially owned by Horizon Corporation. The lands were part
of a sales promotion scheme which Horizon advertised as a future development of modern shopping
centers, coupled with commercial, industrial and residential areas. In 1981 the Federal Trade Commission issued a cease and desist order against Horizon, and that effectively brought an end to the
land sales. After a series of complex transactions and occurrences, the land in question came under
Cibola's ownership. Id. at 776, 737 P.2d at 557.
123. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-38-28(D) (Repl. Pamp. 1986).
124. 105 N.M. at 774, 737 P.2d at 555.
125. The court concluded from this review that the Board had decided that the assessor's valuations
were too high, and that Cibola's were too low. The court found that "the Board chose valuations
in between those offered by Cibola and the assessor's expert as a compromise." Id. at 777, 737
P.2d at 558.
126. The court properly rejected the Board's attempt at compromise because the Board's decision
must be based on the evidence, and basing it merely on the idea of compromise was not a sound
evidentiary basis. Id.
127. See supra note 123.
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practice would have called for a remand to the Board for additional fact-finding. 28
'
The appeals court, however, went on to consider Cibola's second point, in which
Cibola urged the court to enter judgment in favor of Cibola's own valuations.
Cibola argued that its valuations were unrebutted by the county, and were supported by substantial evidence.' 29
In tidy and logical fashion the court of appeals accepted that argument. First,
the court noted that under Trujillo "the whole record review standard allows
independent findings by a reviewing court . . . where the decision of the administrative agency is not supported by substantial evidence." 30 Second, it found
that the county's own expert "could not find that much to argue with in Cibola's
valuations;""' that Cibola's method of valuation was a generally accepted one;
and that it stood unrebutted by the county. The court, therefore, concluded that
"Cibola's valuation is supported by the whole record," thereby requiring that
32
"the Board enter judgment for Cibola in favor of its [Cibola's] valuations.'
The problem with this tidy syllogism, however, is the error of the assumption
underlying its major premise--that Trujillo's substituted judgment principle where
an agency's findings are not supported by substantial evidence applies outside
the unemployment compensation context. 33 As noted above, this standard is
highly intrusive into the sanctity of agency decisionmaking. It therefore undermines the purpose of the substantial evidence test-to set a proper boundary
between meaningful judicial review and ultimate agency responsibility for its
own fact-finding. Its application also fails to give the agency an opportunity to
put the court's guidance to work in the case the court reviewed, thus depriving
the agency of needed experience in improved fact-finding. 13
Thus, after its insightful resolution of the Duke City dilemma by clearly setting
out the "on balance" whole record standard, the Trujillo court went further than
needed by suggesting that substituted judgment would be allowed when an agency
decision was not supported by substantial evidence. While true enough for un128. Under a general remand the assessor may not have been able to produce any more evidence,
which would in all likelihood have led the Board to enter judgment on the basis of Cibola's evidencethe very result compelled by the court's further action in this case. Nonetheless, a remand with
instructions to the agency to do its fact-finding yet again would have proved a useful exercise.
Indeed, it is by such directions that the reviewing courts remain mindful of their limited role, preserve
to the agencies their essential fact-finding missions, and at the same time guide the agencies in the
performance of that function.
129. 105 N.M. at 774, 737 P.2d at 555.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Indeed, as we were reminded in Wilson, the unemployment compensation judicial review
standard is not analogous to other agency reviews because it derives from its own unique statute
and implementing court rule. See 74 N.M. at 8, 389 P.2d at 858. Until the court of appeal's extension
in Cibola, that standard had never been applied to any other agency.
134. For example, in Cibola Energy, if the fault lay with the county's failure to put on a case
rebutting Cibola's valuations, the Board could use the court of appeals' opinion to require the county
to do a better job in providing the Board with more evidence upon which to make a decision. The
thrust of judicial review of agency fact-finding is always to insure that the agency does an adequate
job in the review of the relevant facts. To the extent that agencies fail due to the inadequacy of the
parties, reversals and remands in cases like this give added ammunition to agencies in their efforts
to improve the level of advocacy before them.
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employment compensation cases because of the dictates of the relevant statute
and court rule, such a principle, when applied as it was in Cibola Energy, to
other agencies, undermines in even more serious ways the substantial evidence
balance.
V. THE FUNDAMENTAL TEACHING OF UNIVERSAL CAMERA
The United States Supreme Court decision in Universal Camera v. NLRB 3 '
is the seminal case on the subject of the whole record substantial evidence
standard. Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court explains the intent of Congress in mandating somewhat heightened judicial review by the adoption of that
standard in the federal Administrative Procedures Act.' 36 In the process his
opinion also touched upon the values inherent in such a standard. 137 But that
opinion does even more. It explains-in Justice Frankfurter's inimitable stylehow the essence of substantial evidence review lies in the reasoned application
of the standard to the given facts of a case, rather than its articulation. It is that
portion of Universal Camera which bears most significantly on the seemingly
unending efforts of the New Mexico courts to properly define that standard.
Justice Frankfurter began with the important recognition that the want of
certainty in the substantial evidence cases reflects, in part, "the intractability of
any formula to furnish definiteness of content for all the impalpable factors
135. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
136. Justice Frankfurter's opinion demonstrates how the uneven application of the traditional
substantial evidence standard by the federal courts of appeal in reviewing Labor Board decisions
under the Wagner Act led to criticism in the halls of Congress, which in turn led to enactment of
the Walter-Logan Bill. President Roosevelt, however, vetoed that bill because of its undue restrictions
on the administrative process. 340 U.S. at 478-79.
Justice Frankfurter also explains how debate over the substantial evidence standard was played
out in the final report of the Attorney General's Committee on the Administrative Process which
was submitted in January, 194 1. The majority of the committee rejected a proposal to expand review
by allowing the courts to inquire into whether the findings of the agency were supported "by the
weight of the evidence." The majority thought that departure from the traditional substantial evidence
standard would either create uncertainty, or worse yet, would involve the courts in fact-finding on
matters not within their competence. Attorney General's Committee on the Administrative Process,
Final Report 91-92 (1941). The minority report, however, condemned the prevailing application of
the standard-which, in its view, allowed the reviewing court to focus only on the evidence supporting
the agency decision--and called for adoption of a "whole record" standard. Id. at 210-12.
Against this background, Justice Frankfurter concluded that by inserting the "whole record"
requirement in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) "Congress expressed a mood," 340 U.S.
at 487, reflecting Congress' desire "for stricter and more uniform practice," id. at 489, whereby
reviewing courts "must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight."
Id. at 487-88.
Universal Camera also held that inclusion of the whole record language in the Taft-Hartley Act
evidenced Congress' intent that the standard of review should be the same under both the APA and
Taft-Hartley. Id. at 487.
137. [The courts must now assume more responsibility for the reasonableness and
fairness of Labor Board decisions .... The Board's findings are entitled to respect;
but they must nonetheless be set aside when the record before a Court of Appeals
clearly precludes the Board's decision from being justified by a fair estimate of
the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed judgment on matters within
its special competence or both.
Id. at 490.
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involved in judicial review. ' 38 He went on to point out that the judicial review
standard articulated in the APA "can only serve as a standard for judgment and
not as a body of rigid rules assuring sameness of application."' 39 This is so, he
noted, because a standard helps afford "grounds for certitude, but cannot assure
certainty of application."' " Then, in words, most appropriate to the current New
Mexico controversy, he opined: "Since the precise way in which courts interfere
with agency findings cannot be imprisoned within any form of words, new
formulas attempting to rephrase the old are not likely to be more helpful than
the old. There are no talismatic words that can avoid the process of judgment."'"'
The Court then took up the main substantive question before it-whether the
court of appeals erred in refusing to take into account the report of the hearing
examiner, which had been rejected by the Board. The Court concluded that the
appeals court had erred in this regard because the examiner's report was part of
the record and was therefore worthy of some consideration under the whole
record standard.'42 In so holding, however, the Court indicated that the weight
to be given the examiner's report was a matter for the court of appeals "in
answering the comprehensive
question whether the evidence supporting the Board's
43
order is substantial."'
Thus, Universal Camera makes clear that application rather than articulation
is the key to a comprehensive and consistent understanding of the substantial
evidence standard. The lesson for the New Mexico appellate courts-at least
now that the "light most favorable" versus "on balance" debate has apparently
been resolved-is for them now to get on with the infinitely more difficult task
of reasoned application of that standard rather than more detailed efforts to further
refine the articulation of the standard.'" This is not an easy task, for as Justice
Frankfurter noted, enforcement of such a standard "implies subtlety of mind and
solidity of judgment."45
Without denigrating the difficulty of the task, the courts could show a marked
advancement if they would explain in their opinions, by specific reference to
the facts of record, why in the particular case the evidence "on balance" either
does or does not support the decision of the agency being reviewed. Such an
effort will have a two-fold value. First, and foremost, through such reasoned
138. 340 U.S. at 477.
139. Id. at 487.
140. Id. at 488.
141. Id. at 489.
142. Id. at 493-96.
143. Id. at 497.
144. For example, in Trujillo the court of appeals sought to further explain the whole record
standard by suggesting that the mandated "on balance" approach does not allow for "reweighing
the evidence and reassigning the preponderance of evidence." 105 N.M. at 471, 734 P.2d at 249
(quoting Duke City, 101 N.M. at 294, 681 P.2d at 720.). This instruction leaves us with yet another
level of confusion because the reviewing court must balance the evidence, but at the same time
avoid both "weighing" or evaluating "predominance"-a seemingly impossible task.
All of this merely confirms the import of Justice Frankfurter's instruction: The real meaning of
the substantial evidence test can only come from the difficult act of judicial application. Indeed, the
above passage from Trujillo only suggests that beyond a certain point the more intense the attempt
to refine the articulation of the test, the more unclear it is bound to become.
145. 340 U.S. at 487.
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elaboration, the standard will take on more meaning and will become more
understandable than through continued efforts to find the illusive perfect way to
articulate it. ' Only through such reasoned application will agencies and litigants
be guided concerning the kind of evidence and manner of presentation which
will sustain administrative agency decisions."'4 Second, the presence of reasoned
elaboration in our appellate court opinions will help put counsel on notice that
it is reasoned elaboration in briefs and arguments which will win cases. Just as
too many substantial evidence opinions leap from the articulation of the standard
to the result, the briefs lawyers submit to the appellate courts are often similarly
deficient. Good appellate argument necessarily requires a cogent application of
the standard to the facts of the particular case, together with a reasoned argument
pointing out: 1) why the particular question involves or fails to involve the
particular expertise of the agency, thus demanding more or less judicial deference,
and/or 2) why the process the agency utilized was such that it should or should
not give the court confidence in deferring to the agency's fact-finding. These
questions are significant, especially in marginal cases, because the substantial
evidence test attempts to define the balance of the relationship between court
and agency, not as an end in itself, but rather to serve certain values such as
deference to agency expertise, assurance that fundamental rights are protected,
and the honing of agency processes to protect rights and lead to correct results.
Furthermore, this process is necessarily synergistic. The more reasoned the
application of the standard which finds its way into the appellate decisions, the
more likely the appellate courts will receive more reasoned briefs and arguments.
With the increase in the latter, the reasoned decisionmaking of our appellate
courts will invariably improve, and become easier for the judges to fashion.
One final point from UniversalCamerarequires mention in this context. Justice
Frankfurter, in UniversalCamera, suggests that the reviewing function is properly
focused in one judicial institution. Showing great respect for the courts of appeal-where the Labor Act places the substantial evidence review in the first
instance-Justice Frankfurter eschews any need for additional, repetitive review
in the United States Supreme Court:
146. The supreme court's application of the substantial evidence standard in Jimenez v. Department of Corrections, 101 N.M. 795, 689 P.2d 1266 (1984), is a good case in point. Although there
the court also split over the appropriate reading of Duke City, the majority and dissenting opinions
at least gave us a sense of their reading of the record, so that we understood why the majority
believed the evidence in support of the agency decision was substantial and why the dissenters
believed it was not. See supra text accompanying notes 67-76. Only with that kind of application
will the courts flesh out the standard and give guidance to agencies and litigants in terms of the
kinds of evidence necessary to sustain administrative decisions.
147. Agencies and litigants should also be mindful that, in marginal cases, the courts will always
be focusing on the nature of the question the agency must resolve, and the process the agency must
use in the resolution of that question. Again Jimenez provides us with a meaningful example.
In that case it is arguable that Justice Walters' dissent was driven by three important factors. First,
the agency decision-whether to terminate Jimenez--did not implicate particular agency expertise.
Rather it presented a typical question of neglect of duty-an issue upon which the common law
courts have equal if not greater experience. Second, that question touched upon a fundamental
personal right to earn a livelihood. Such "rights" implicate due process concerns, which might
justify more intensified substantial evidence review. See supra note 53. Third, and finally, the facts
suggested less than adequate process, since the recommendation for termination came before it was
known that 10 of the I I escapes came before Jimenez had begun his duty shift.
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Our power to review the correctness of application of the present standard
ought seldom to be called into action. Whether on the record as a whole
there is substantial evidence to support agency findings is a question which
Congress has placed in the keeping of the Courts of Appeals. This Court
will intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the standard
appears to have been misapprehended or grossly misapplied."'
This relatively hands off approach by the United States Supreme Court'49 is
a prudential guideline driven in part by that Court's need to reserve its limited
resources for the most compelling of the cases which seek its discretionary review
by way of certiorari. It also commends itself as a general principle applicable
to state court judicial review of administrative agency decisions.
A second-tier of judicial review which limits the state supreme court to a
consideration of whether the substantial evidence standard "was misapprehended
or grossly misapplied" has several virtues. First, it avoids the time and expense
of basically redundant judicial review. Second, it prevents the forum shopping
aspects of the current system under which the supreme court merely reevaluates
the essential substantial evidence balance and virtually ignores the decision of
the first reviewing court. " Third, the second-tier of judicial review ought to be
a review of the work of the first court, '5 rather than the agency, and the Universal
Camera standard shifts the focus in that direction. Fourth, and finally, such a
standard refocuses the attention of our supreme court to where it rightfully
belongs-defining the legal principles and standards which are to govern litigants
and the courts-rather than a redundant attention to whether the particular decision of a particular agency is correct.'5 2
148. 340 U.S. at 490-91 (emphasis added).
149. Indeed, the Supreme Court has consistently applied that even more deferential standard to
its ultimate review of substantial evidence questions under other statutes. E.g., American Textile
Manufacturers Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 523 (1981) (substantial evidence review under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 417 U.S.
283, 310 (1974) (substantial evidence review of FPC ratemaking under the Natural Gas Act); Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396, 401 (1958) (Supreme Court substantial evidence
review of price discrimination cases under Robinson-Patman Act limited to deciding whether "Court
of Appeals has made a fair assessment of the record.").
150. The supreme court must "make the same review of the ... [agency] determination as the
district court. Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 101 N.M. 470, 477,
684 P.2d 1135, 1142 (1984). See also, e.g., Transcontinental Bus Sys. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 67
N.M. 56, 352 P.2d 245 (1959). As a result, litigants tend to take a "second bite" attitude toward
further judicial review once they lose in the lower court.
151. Interestingly enough, in a recent unemployment compensation case, the court of appeals
ignored the settled law, which requires the second court to reevaluate the evidence anew, see supra
note 74, and suggested a different standard for second-tier review. In affirming the Agency and the
district court, the court of appeals, in Hinojosa v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 105 N.M. 212, 730 P.2d
1194 (Ct. App. 1987), noted that the district court was required to review the entire record to
determine if the Department's decision was supported by substantial evidence. It then suggested a
slightly different role for the court of appeals, when considering appeals from those district court
judgments-limiting itself to a review of "the evidence considered by the lower court" and then
viewing that evidence "in favor of proceedings in the trial court." Id. at 213, 730 P.2d at 1195.
See infra text accompanying notes 172-180.
152. For an earlier discussion arguing for a narrower standard of second-tier judicial review of
administrative fact-finding, see 1983-84 Administrative Law Survey, supra note 54, at 150-52.
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VI. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR RESOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTIES
The New Mexico appellate courts have made great strides in the development
5
of a coherent body of administrative law principles. ' They are to be applauded
for their continued struggle to make sense out of the substantial evidence test,
and to make of it a device to assure meaningful judicial review of agency factfinding, while protecting against unwarranted judicial intervention into the essential fact-finding role of our administrative agencies. In the process, however,
the courts have lost sight of the central touchstone in the substantial evidence
inquiry-its reasoned application to the particular facts of the given case. In
addition, a new and troublesome strain has found its way into our caselaw-the
thought that without a specific legislative mandate to that effect, reviewing courts
might on some occasions substitute their own judgment of the facts for those of
the agency being reviewed. Furthermore, some old, and perhaps outmoded notions have survived-i.e., that the fact-based decisions of agencies must, in all
circumstances, be supported by a "residuum" of legally admissible evidence,
and the retention of a second-tier of redundant review by a subsequent court
when an initial court has already undertaken substantial evidence judicial review.
The foregoing analysis of these residual problems leads to the following four
suggestions for the resolution of the post-Duke City difficulties:
1. Reviewing Courts Should, in Substantial Evidence Cases, Focus
Their Attention on the Application of the Whole Record Standard
to the ParticularFacts Before Them, Rather Than Attempting to
FurtherRefine the Articulation of the Standard
Universal Camera forcefully suggested, and the cases from Duke City to
Trujillo and Cibola Energy Corporation, make painfully clear, that the search
for the perfect articulation of the substantial evidence standard is a modem quest
for the holy grail. General standards like the substantial evidence test, at best,
are merely frameworks for the difficult task of making judicial judgments. As
Justice Frankfurter so aptly put it, "[t]here are no talismatic words that can avoid
the process of judgment."'" Indeed, the ever intensifying judicial search to
further refine the articulation of the standard only diverts judicial attention from
the essential task of making the hard judgments in often difficult cases. By being
explicit in opinions about the application of the standard to the particular factsi.e., why on the particular record the facts supporting or failing to support the
153. In addition to the courts' recent concern with the progressive development of the substantial
evidence standard, our courts have been involved in furthering the development of modem and
comprehensive rules governing administrative procedure. Two examples are the courts' insistence
that agency determinations be articulated in findings and conclusions, see, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v.
Bernalillo County Valuation Protest Bd., 90 N.M. 110, 560 P.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1977); see also
cases cited supra note 107, and the construction of the State Rules Act to require the public filing
of agency rules before the courts will enforce those rules, see State v. Joyce, 94 N.M. 618, 614
P.2d 30 (Ct. App. 1980). The general approach of our appellate courts is to develop consistent, and
practical rules which help advance the cause of reasoned and fair administrative practices throughout
the state.
154. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 489.
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decision predominate--the court gives infinitely more guidance to agencies and
litigants 155
than it does in its ever more puzzling reformulations of the test being
applied.
Indeed, a comparison of two of the most recent post-Trujillo and Cibola Energy
Corporationcourt of appeals decisions applying the Duke City standard demonstrates the value inherent in such an approach.' 56 Perkins v. Department of
Human Services,"'5 dealt with the sufficiency of the evidence in an appeal from
a district court affirmance of a decision by the State Personnel Board to dismiss
two employees from the Human Services Department. The appellants did not
contest the extensive findings of the hearing officer, which had been adopted by
the Board. Rather, they "made a generalized attack contending that the findings
are not supported by substantial evidence.""15 Confronted with that kind of
unfocused claim, the court of appeals merely recited the hearing officer's detailed
findings,' 59 stated the Duke City standard embellished by the "on balance" gloss
from Trujillo and CibolaEnergy Corporation," and then concluded that "[a]pplying
the above rules . . . and based on a full review of the record . . . we determined
that the findings and conclusions of the Board and the district court were supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole."' 6
Perhaps this undifferentiated and non-analytical approach was forced on the
Perkins court by appellants' generalized attack on the sufficiency of the evidence.
But if so, the court ought not allow itself to be placed in that kind of position.
If substantial evidence judicial review is to provide any guidance to agencies
and litigants, then those appellate opinions must explain how the facts support
or fail to support the decision, and by doing so the courts will inevitably force
counsel to similarly focus their substantial evidence arguments in a reasoned
fashion. 162
Akel v. New Mexico Human Services Department,63
' decided two weeks after
Perkins, stands in marked contrast to Perkins. Akel involved an administrative
155. Of course the theory being espoused here requires that judges remain disciplined in their
approach to these problems, being ever mindful of their limited role. No matter how wedded to
concerns for justice and fairness a given judge may be, there will undoubtedly be administrative
decisions which, upon review, a judge believes are somewhat harsh, and yet are supported by
substantial evidence. In those instances, the judge must still affirm-lest he or she do a graver
general injustice by undoing the delicate balance between the role of reviewing court and agency in
the matter of agency fact-finding.
156. The supreme court, on occasion, has also engaged in the kind of reasoned application of
the substantial evidence standard being advocated here. See supra text accompanying notes 67-74.
157. 106 N.M. 651, 748 P.2d 24 (1987).
158. Id. at 645, 748 P.2d at 27.
159. Id. at 655, 748 P.2d at 28.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. It may well be that the Perkins court should have refused to consider the "generalized"
substantial evidence claim put forward by appellants. At a minimum the court should require that
litigants who base an administrative appeal on the lack of substantial evidence point to those findings
which are not supported by substantial evidence, and then explain why the evidence which does
exist on the point is insufficient to rise to the level of "substantial evidence based on the record as
a whole." This would necessarily require a recitation of the competing contrary evidence, which
would greatly aid the court in its "on balance" review mandated by Trujillo and Cibola Energy
Corp.
163. 106 N.M. 741, 749 P.2d 1120 (Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 107 N.M. 74, 752 P.2d 789
(1988).
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appeal from the denial of general assistance benefits by the Department. In this
case the Department highlighted the items in the record which it contended
supported the denial of benefits, and the court of appeals was therefore able to
focus its attention on each piece of evidence. With respect to one piece of
evidence, the court concluded that the statements in the vocational expert's report
were not sufficient, when taken in the context of the entire report, to constitute
substantial evidence."6 A second piece of evidence was discounted on purely
legal grounds, 6 ' and the third piece of evidence---the determination by the
Incapacity Review Unit (IRU) that appellant could perform her normal household
duties-was also discounted by the court of appeals in a reasoned way. The IRU
decision was probed by the court, and found to be based on appellant's past
work record."6 The court concluded that "her past work experience does not,
...without more, constitute substantial evidence in support of the Department's
decision."' 67 Based on its analysis of the foregoing evidence put forward by the
Department, together with its review of the other evidence of record, the court
concluded that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence, and
reversed the decision of the Department.
Such an approach focused on the inquiry, was instructive to the agency and
the claimant, and helped direct both parties to the relevant evidence and how
that evidence should be considered in the decisionmaking process. It is this kind
of reasoned judgment which the application of the substantial evidence test is
intended to foster, both for the benefits of litigants and agencies alike. It is,
therefore, the Akel rather than the Perkins approach which must be fostered if
the substantial evidence standard is to grow and develop in New Mexico's
administrative law jurisprudence.
2. The Courts Must Reject the Cibola Energy Corporation
Approach, Which Allows the Reviewing Court to Substitute Its
Judgment of the Factsfor Those of the Agency Whenever the
Agency Decision is not Supported by Substantial Evidence
The recent struggle to define the whole record standard exemplified by the
development of the law from Duke City to Trujillo represents an admirable search
164. Id. at 742, 749 P.2d at 1121. The vocational specialist's report did have some language
indicating that the appellant might be employable, but a focused look at those statements in the
context of the whole report convinced the court that the report was very tentative on that point, and
that its major thrust was only that further assessment of the appellant was recommended. Id. This
is precisely the kind of reasoned analysis that the substantial evidence test, however formulated,
ought to require of a reviewing court.
165. The Department had argued that appellant's ineligibility for federal Social Security benefits
ought to be evidence of her ineligibility for general assistance. Since, however, denial of eligibility
for social security was one of the qualifying criteria under the general assistance regulations, the
court "declined to adopt such an anomalous position," id. at 743, 749 P.2d at 1122, more as a
matter of law than of fact.
166. In fairness, the Department was really arguing that this case was governed by a prior case,
New Mexico Human Servs. Dep't v. Tapia, 97 N.M. 632, 642 P.2d 1091 (1982), which had held
that an IRU determination constituted substantial evidence. The Department was, therefore, arguing
from Tapia that as a matter of law the IRU determination met the substantial evidence standard. The
court of appeals distinguished Tapia because that case did not consider the whole record, thus
suggesting that Tapia may not survive the Duke City-Trujillo-Cibola Energy Corp. developments.
167. Id.
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for the proper balance between adequate judicial review and the sanctity of
agency fact-finding. Much of this important development could be seriously
threatened, however, if the Cibola Energy Corporation principle continues to
flourish. That principle-allowing the reviewing court which finds the agency
decision not supported by substantial evidence to make its own findings and
render judgment thereon-subverts the very principle which Duke City and Trujillo established. Admittedly, that substitution of judgment standard has its roots
in the peculiar statutory review provisions provided for decisions of the Employment Security Department, and in that context, the standard must apply
unless and until it is changed by the legislature."'6 Extension of that troublesome
standard, however, to all substantial evidence cases, as suggested in Cibola
Energy Corporationundermines the values sought to be achieved by maintaining
the whole record review standard. The whole record standard assures meaningful
judicial review, but it still dictates a limited role for courts, and thereby protects
the essential fact-finding role of the agencies. General application of the Cibola
Energy Corporation standard will destroy that delicate balance anytime a court
finds the agency decision unsupported by the evidence contained in the whole
record. Cibola Energy Corporationshould therefore be overruled, and the loose
dicta from Trujillo and Garcia,on which it was based, should be firmly rejected.
3. The Courts Should Limit the Legal Residuum Doctrine to Those
Cases in which FundamentalPersonal Rights are Threatened by
Traditional Guilt or Innocence-Like Determinations
A further, if tangential, concern in this area emanates from the aspects of the
Duke City decision which resurrects a full-blown legal residuum rule.' 69 Our
supreme court previously had rejected the general application of the legal residuum rule as inconsistent with the needed flexibility of agencies to decide questions
based on reasonable and probative evidence, unconstrained by the technical rules
of evidence. 70 Its rejuvenation in Duke City, however, suggests that all agencies
must now not only be mindful of the substantiality of the evidence on the whole
record, but must, in addition, make sure that there is at least a modicum of
"legally admissible evidence" to support their every decision.
This added constraint on agency decisionmaking is certainly unnecessary,
given the adoption of the whole record standard, which allows for more meaningful judicial review. It is also a frustrating constraint which serves very little
if any purpose outside the context of personal rights litigation.' 7' Thus, the
168. The supreme court, however, in its rule-making capacity, could have an impact on the
standard by a judicious amendment of Rule 1-081.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 47-57.
170. Indeed, one might have thought that the ultimate question for decision in Duke City-i.e.,
whether the wood burning smoke emanating from the Duke City burner at its Espanola sawmill was
hazardous to health-was one of those difficult and technical questions which an expert agency
should decide, based on reasonable and credible evidence without regard to rules of admissibility.
It is interesting that the Duke City court did not say that the citizen testimony was incredible or not
worthy of consideration. Nor does the Duke City opinion reflect any unfairness to Duke City which
resulted from the court of appeals' partial reliance on that unsworn testimony.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54; see also, supra note 39.
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resurrection of the legal residuum test in Duke City is a minor but unfortunate
glitch in the otherwise reasonable attempt to stabilize the proper balance between
reviewing court and agency in the complex matter of agency fact-finding. Its
rejection would help make that relationship more consonant with the general
principles which underlie the whole record standard.
4. The Supreme Court Should Consider Limiting Second-Tier
Judicial Review in SubstantialEvidence Cases
While the thrust of the whole record standard is to increase rather than decrease
the scope of judicial review of agency fact-finding, having that review repeated
by a second appellate court makes little sense and undermines respect for the
judiciary by fostering a kind of forum shopping by litigants who seek a "secondbite." That second-tier review should serve as a means of insuring that the first
court has done its job in reviewing the agency. Therefore, a standard focused
on that task is more appropriate to second-tier judicial review of agency factfinding. The United States Supreme Court's focus on whether the courts of appeal
have "misapprehended the standard, or grossly misapplied it" serves that latter
function, and helps deter resort to further appeal by those litigants who have
lost but have been treated fairly by the reviewing court. It, or something akin
to it,"' is recommended as a counterpoint to the whole record standard-together
they would work to liberalize judicial review of agency fact-finding in the first
instance, and then narrow that review when it comes to further consideration by
a higher court.
Indeed, our court of appeals has not been unmindful of the value inherent in
a more narrow scope of review when a second appeal is had from an administrative agency. Most recently, in Rowley v. Murray,'73 the court applied a more
deferential standard of review to its second-tier judicial review of a property
assessment decision by the City of Clovis. In that case the property owners
challenged the City's estimated benefit of the improvements to their land for the
purpose of assessing costs for the improvement of the adjacent street.' 74 The
district court concluded that the City's benefit determination lacked a reasonable
basis, and reversed the decision of the City Commission."'
When the City appealed the district court's decision, the essential issue was
whether the applicable appeal statute mandated a trial de novo in the district
court, or whether the district court was confined to a review of the record at the
City Commission.' 76 The court of appeals concluded that the district court was
limited, under the applicable statute, to a review of the record before the governing body. The court, therefore, reversed the order entered by the district court
172. The "misapprehended or grossly misapplied" standard makes good sense, particularly where
joined with a court imposed requirement that lower courts make clear in their findings and conclusions
how and why they struck the substantial evidence balance the way they did. See Cibola Energy
Corp. v. Roselli, 105 N.M. 774, 737 P.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1987) (district court reviewing agency
decision must make findings and conclusions which reveal basis for the decision).
173. 106 N.M. 676, 748 P.2d 973 (Ct. App. 1987).
174. Id. at 677, 748 P.2d at 974.
175. Id.
176. Id.
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after a de novo hearing as being in excess of the jurisdiction conferred by the
statute. 177 The court went on, however, in dicta, to direct the district court on
the proper standard of review under the applicable statute.77 The court also
indicated that the standard of review in subsequent appeals from the district court
to the court of appeals would be somewhat different, and even more deferential
than that applied by the district court. 7 The second-tier review, according to
the court of appeals, would only be afforded to determine "whether the district
court applied the relevant standard of review to the city's determination." 8
Thus, Rowley demonstrates the recent recognition by the court of appeals that
second-tier judicial review serves a separate and distinct function from that of
the first level of judicial review. The conservation of judicial resources is also
served by confining the second court to a more limited function. It is this kind
of more deferential judicial review which is being advocated here for all substantial evidence second-tier judicial review cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
Above all else, Duke City represents our supreme court's willingness to adjust
the balance of authority between agencies and courts, when necessary to enhance
the values associated with the roles of each. Consistency with Duke City's
overriding principle-i.e., that courts must play a role which encompasses meaningful review of agency fact-finding without undermining the primary role of
the agency to control its own fact-finding-may require adoption of some additional new doctrine, as well as the jettisoning of some old doctrine. Constancy
to this important principle, however, can be achieved only by the reasoned
application of an agreed upon standard. Such reasoned application by courts and
advocates will keep us on the path of proper accommodation in an ever changing
and increasingly complex world of administrative regulation.

177. Id. at 680, 748 P.2d at 977.
178. The applicable statute failed to delineate a standard of review. Because the City Council
was acting in a legislative capacity, however, the court of appeals concluded that the district court
should afford great deference to the Council's decision, reversing only if "the absence of any benefit
is clear or unless there is evidence of fraud, mistake, or discrimination that amounts to arbitrary
conduct." 106 N.M. at 680, 748 P.2d at 977. Thus, Rowley is not a pure substantial evidence case,
although its dictates with respect to second-tier judicial review are equally applicable in pure substantial evidence cases.
179. Id. at 680, P.2d at 977.
180. Id. at 681, P.2d at 978.

